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This paper explores the role and meaning of Chinese-Indonesian civic organisations, which have 
emerged in Indonesia since the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998 in preventing recurring ethnic 
violence. The paper analyses relationships between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians and the 
sufferings of Chinese Indonesians before and during the May 1998 riots. The paper then investigates 
reactions of the Chinese community to the riots. It highlights the activities of inter-ethnic civic 
organisations including the Indonesian Chinese Association (INTI), Homeland Solidarity (SNB), the 
Indonesian Anti-Discrimination Movement (GANDI), and the Volunteer Team for Humanity (TRuK) in 
mobilising various stake-holders to fight for legal justice and protect minority rights in the post-
Suharto era. Their endeavours are a new and innovative experiment in Indonesian history. The paper 
argues that in the post-Suharto era, the security of Chinese Indonesians is being improved as the 
activities of these inter-ethnic civic organisations and their networks build social trust and promote 
cooperation between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians.  
 
Keywords: Prevention of ethnic violence, Anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, Chinese-Indonesian 





Indonesia has been torn by massive ethnic violence over the last decade. One of the prime 
targets of the ethnic violence was Chinese Indonesians,1 who comprise around 3 per cent of 
the population and are regarded as the economically dominant group in Indonesia. During 
the economic crisis of 1998, Chinese Indonesians suffered most from mob violence in 
Jakarta, Solo, and other major cities. As a result, more than 1,000 people died, at least 100 
Chinese women were gang-raped, and thousands of shops were burned to the ground (see 
Pattiradjawane 2000; Turner 2003). The sufferings of the Chinese-Indonesian community 
during the May 1998 riots were a watershed to reconsider their ethnic security in the post-
Suharto era. They, therefore, started to devise a new avenue to protect them, taking 
advantage of the Reformasi (Reform) that has swept over the country in the past ten years. 
To this end, they have renewed their own identity and begun to establish political parties and 
civic organisations.2 Some of the literature has analysed the emergence of Chinese civic 
                                                          
* I thank Prof. David Lovell, Dr. Minako Sakai, Dr. Edwin Jurriens and two anonymous referees for 
their invaluable comments and suggestions. 
1 I use the term ‘Chinese Indonesian(s)’ in this paper when referring to ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
regardless of time periods. 
2  The term ‘civic organisation’ refers in this paper to groups of non-governmental, voluntary, 
autonomous, and non-profit organisations or movements that can contribute to address community 
problems and devise alternative ideas and values. Therefore, civic organisations include non-
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organisations in Indonesia since the fall of the President Suharto (see Freeman 2003; Giblin 
2003; Hoon 2006; Suryadinata 2001; Turner and Allen 2007; Wibowo 2001). They generally 
focus on the diverse range of identity formations of Chinese Indonesians and emphasise legal 
and political changes in order to secure the safety of Chinese Indonesians. But little attention 
has been paid to the role and meaning of the new and innovative Chinese civic organisations, 
which create inter-ethnic civic networks, in preventing recurrent ethnic violence and 
protecting minority rights in Indonesia.  
This paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the new trend of Chinese civic 
organisations in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. The emergence of these organisations is a 
new and innovative experiment for the Chinese-Indonesian community because, historically, 
Chinese Indonesians tended to forge their own organisations and networks. Moreover, during 
the New Order period (1967-1998), they built a patron-client relationship with indigenous 
elites throughout the Indonesian archipelago for securing their political and economic 
interests. After the May 1998 riots, however, the Chinese community initiated the 
establishment of inter-ethnic civic organisations and these organisations forged inter-ethnic 
civic networks with indigenous groups in order to secure their rights and safety. Why did 
they forge these networks, and what are the aims of these new organisations? What do these 
new civic organisations mean for the future security of the Chinese community in Indonesia?  
This paper explains these questions in the context of social capital, proposed by Robert D. 
Putnam, and civil society engagement, developed by Ashutosh Varshney. I argue that with 
inter-ethnic civic organisations and their networks, the security of Chinese Indonesians is 
being improved as the inter-ethnic civic organisations create social trust and facilitate 
cooperation between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I will discuss the relationship 
between social capital and civic network in facilitating ethnic peace. The history of Chinese 
Indonesians and anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia will be analysed in the section III. In the 
section IV, I will analyse the emergence of inter-ethnic civic organisations and their 
activities in Jakarta and Solo, where massive anti-Chinese riots took place in May 1998. In 
the last section, I will draw my conclusions. 
 
 
2. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT  
 
In the past decade, scholars of ethnic politics have taken up the concept of social capital 
to explain ethnic peace. They argue that social capital functions as a catalyst for ethnic peace 
in divided societies. Among them, based on his research in Italy, Robert D. Putnam (1993) 
argues that all forms of social capital are beneficial to society because they facilitate trust and 
norms in society as a whole. He defines social capital as “norms of reciprocity and networks 
of civil engagement” which are created by participation in civil organisations (1993: 167). 
Putnam emphasises the democratic potential of horizontal networks as opposed to the 
vertical networks of patron-client arrangements. But the theory has been subjected to 
criticism on theoretical and empirical grounds. One of the criticisms is that the concept fails 
to exactly delineate which civic organisations and networks are beneficial. This is because 
                                                          
governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, student organisations, charitable organisations, 
social movements, faith-based institutions, sports clubs, and other social organisations as long as they 
are independent from state, and aim to promote social cohesion and welfare of whole society members. 




not all civic organisations and networks facilitate coordination and cooperation for common 
goals. Some examples of the negative side of social capital do exist. As Putzel (1997) 
demonstrates, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in some Southeast Asian countries such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines have relied for their business advancement on their own 
exclusive networks. Some other negative examples are networks of criminal gangs (e.g. the 
Mafia) and Islamic fundamentalist groups (e.g. Al Qaeda). 
In order to render the concept more workable, Putnam (2000) makes a distinction 
between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to 
social norms and networks that facilitate in-group solidarity or homogeneity of the ethnic 
relationship. Meanwhile bridging social capital refers to those that foster inter-group 
solidarity or heterogeneity. Putnam maintains that an active civil society can enrich bridging 
social capital, which is conducive to peace or harmony between sections of society. In view 
of this, Martin van Bruinessen (2004) maintains that some religious organisations in 
Indonesia, such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, invest their time and energy 
to create bridging social capital in society through public education in religious pluralism, 
the provision of health care, and advocacy for minority rights.  
In fact, the concept of bridging social capital has a similar function to the concept of 
Ashutosh Varshney’s inter-ethnic civic engagement. Varshney (2001; 2002) sees that 
bridging social capital may have a similar positive effect on preventing ethnic violence in 
divided societies. He pays attention to the positive impact of social capital and applies this to 
Indian cities. Analysing the structures of the ethnic relationship between Hindus and 
Muslims in Indian cities, he finds that organised inter-ethnic civic engagements at the local 
level function as the prime cause of ethnic peace during times of crisis. In other words, civic 
organisations and their networks are beneficial to the prevention of ethnic violence when 
their membership crosses ethnic boundaries. He argues that inter-ethnic civic engagement 
facilitates ethnic peace, while intra-ethnic engagement promotes ethnic violence. Mohammad 
Z. Tadjoeddin (2004) sees inter-ethnic civic engagement as a useful avenue to prevent ethnic 
violence in Indonesia, where societies are generally segregated along ethnic and religious 
lines. This concept is consistent with the earlier finding of Stolle (1998) that associations 
with heterogeneous memberships tend to produce more beneficial consequences for society 
as a whole than those with homogenous memberships.  
Consequently, networks of civic engagement foster norms of reciprocity and facilitate the 
emergence of social trust. Such networks can function as a channel for communication and 
cooperation. In this sense, ethnic violence is more easily avoided in a community that has a 
substantial stock of bridging social capital and dense inter-ethnic civic networks. 
 
 
3. ETHNIC SEGREGATION AND ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA 
 
During the Dutch colonial period (1596-1942), Indonesian society was segregated along 
ethnic lines and this segregation had a profound and lasting impact on local society. For 
political and economic purposes, the Dutch deliberately separated the Chinese population 
from the indigenous population (Suryadinata 2001: 502). A three-tier ‘plural society’ 
(Furnivall 1948) was developed in Indonesia: a society that was segregated with Europeans 
(mainly Dutch) at the top, Chinese Indonesians in the middle, and indigenous Indonesians 
(pribumi) at the bottom. Chinese Indonesians, as a group, had a higher status than indigenous 
Indonesians, and they played a significant role in tax collection and the trades (Chernov 
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2003: 104). This colonial policy contributed to the antagonistic relationship between Chinese 
and indigenous Indonesians, and the ethnic segregation became one of the most enduring 
legacies that have affected Indonesian society until the present (Hefner 2001: 19; Mozali 
1994: 59). Chinese Indonesians were the usual target of ethnic violence during political 
turmoil and economic crises in Indonesia. They bore a brunt of ethnic violence instigated by 
Islamic groups during 1920s and 1940s (Bertrand 2006; Yang 2001). 
The colonial legacies impacted on the relationship between Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesians in the post-independence period. Since 1950, Indonesian governments have 
promoted an ideology of ethnic and religious pluralism through the doctrine of Pancasila 
(Five National Principles),3 which refers to non-sectarian and humanistic values (Nagata 
2000: 229). But Chinese Indonesians were not considered to be indigenous Indonesians; they 
were excluded and discriminated against by various laws and regulations (Coppel 1983: 3).  
The implementation of such differentiation appeared in government regulations and 
policies, and impacted on every aspect of the lives of Chinese Indonesians including 
education, legal status and cultural life. An obvious area of discrimination was that Chinese 
Indonesians had to possess a Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia (SBKRI, 
Certificate of Indonesian Citizenship). The SBKRI had to be produced to apply for official 
documents such as ID cards and passports. Without a SBKRI, therefore, many Chinese 
Indonesians remained stateless and their rights were limited (Freedman 2003: 446). The 
abolition of this discrimination has been one of main targets for inter-ethnic civic 
organisations in the post-Suharto era.  
The discrimination was more pronounced during the New Order government. In 1967, 
the newly established Suharto’s New Order government set a rule for Chinese Indonesians’ 
behaviour with ‘The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem (Pedoman 
Penyelesaian Masalah Cina di Indonesia).’ For the purposes of social control, Chinese-
Indonesian political parties, schools, and social organisations were banned (Tan 1991: 116-9). 
The New Order government also pushed Chinese Indonesians to change their names to 
Indonesian-sounding ones, expressions of Chinese culture were confined to indoor activities, 
and the use of Chinese characters was banned in public (Giblin 2003: 356). While the 
government compelled Chinese Indonesians to assimilate, they could not, however, 
assimilate fully into the indigenous society because they had been given special identity 
cards, which contained codes to differentiate them from indigenous ones. Therefore the 
citizenship status of Chinese Indonesians was problematic throughout the New Order period.   
During the New Order period (1967-98), ethnic harmony or peaceful ethnic relationships 
between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians was maintained by the state, particularly by 
military intervention. The maintenance of political and social stability in the achievement of 
economic development constituted the prime agenda of the regime. To this end, the New 
Order government banned any discussion of SARA issues, which included Suku (Ethnicity), 
Agama (Religion), Ras (Race), and Antar-golongan (Class) in society. The New Order 
government also attempted to control all civic organisations in Indonesia including Chinese-
Indonesian ones (Purdey 2006: 16).  
Meanwhile, the economic prowess of Chinese Indonesians was significantly extended as 
they succeeded in forging symbiotic business ties with the power holders of the Suharto 
                                                          
3 Pancasila means the five principles including Belief in God; Unity of Indonesia; Humanitarianism; 
Democracy; and Social Justice. It was deliberately abstract in order to accommodate all ethnic and 
religious groups in Indonesian society.  




government, including the military. A number of Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs, such as 
Sudomo Salim and Bob Hasan, became notorious clients of President Suharto and his family. 
This patron-client arrangement continued under the protection of government officials 
throughout the Indonesian archipelago. There were many incidents in which security forces 
sided with Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs in industrial disputes, often resulting in the 
oppression of the indigenous workers by force. As a result of this biased relationship, from 
the mid-1990s, Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs (particularly Chinese conglomerates) were 
accused of being the root cause of Korupsi, Kolusi and Nepotisme (KKN, Corruption, 
Collusion and Nepotism) and this accusation also applied to all Chinese Indonesians 
regardless of their social class (Schwartz 1999: 99). This negative image rendered Chinese 
Indonesians as a group vulnerable vis-à-vis indigenous Indonesians.  
During the economic crisis of 1997/1998, the colonial legacies contributed to an outburst 
of anti-Chinese violence when the Suharto government lost its control over Indonesian 
society. When an unprecedented economic crisis hit Indonesia in late 1997, its devastating 
consequences fed into the already tense social, economic, and political milieu. As Collier 
(1999) points out, growth provides people with hope, but rapid economic decline facilitates 
violent conflict in society. From early 1998, rioting over staple foods began to occur in many 
cities and towns in Java (Purdey 2006: 219-20). The steep rises in food prices, combined 
with massive food shortages and increasing unemployment, placed many people in a dire 
situation (Hill 1999: 6). They were angry and frustrated with the inability of the government 
and the perceived wealth of Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs and these tensions culminated 
in May 1998 (Turner 2003). The poverty and people’s anger fuelled the anti-Chinese riots. 
Ethnic violence against Chinese Indonesians in May 1998, in Jakarta, Solo, and some large 
cities in Indonesia, became a symbol of the national turmoil which resulted from the 
economic crisis of 1998 (Pattiradjawane 2000; Siegel 2001). The riots caused great turmoil 
in Indonesia for several days. Chinese Indonesians were badly affected and shocked by the 
riots. They received almost no protection from the government and security forces. In Jakarta 
and Solo, during the violence of 13-15 May 1998, more than 1,000 people died and 
numerous shops, banks, cars, and other properties were looted and burned to the ground 
(Pattiradjawane 2000; Purdey 2006; Turner 2003). During the riots, more than 70,000 
Chinese Indonesians and a huge amount of Chinese-Indonesian capital (approximately 
US$ 110 billion) fled Indonesia to safer places such as Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and the USA (Suryadinata 2001: 508). Large numbers of Chinese Indonesians in the 
violent cities migrated to safer places such as Bali (Wibowo 2001: 136). Although the 
victims of the 1998 May riots were people from diverse ethnic backgrounds, the riots were 
regarded as anti-Chinese because Chinese Indonesians and their properties was the prime 
target of the mob attacks. The damage caused by the riots was considerable and the 
sufferings of the Chinese-Indonesian community attracted the attention of the media, NGOs, 
and many observers (Coppel 2001: 26). Soon after the violence, the Suharto regime 
crumbled. 
What happened after the fall of President Suharto? What lessons did Chinese Indonesians 
draw from the May 1998 riots? How can Chinese Indonesians avoid a recurrence of this 
ethnic violence? In the next section, I will analyse a process of democratisation and the new 
development of Chinese organisations in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. It will explain 
why the Chinese community has established inter-ethnic social organisations. 
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4. CIVIC NETWORKS AND BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN AN ERA OF 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
The fall of President Suharto ushered in an era of democratisation in Indonesia. The 
Chinese-Indonesian community has experienced significant change in its relationship with 
both national politics and its indigenous counterparts. The succeeding government, President 
B. J. Habibie, began to amend or abolish laws and regulations that were designated to control 
political parties and social organisations during the Suharto period (Freedman 2003: 439). 
The government repealed the regulations for the ban of Chinese language and special codes 
in ID card for Chinese Indonesians. The government released political detainees and labour 
activists, and guaranteed freedom of expression and associational autonomy. Indonesian 
society responded with the formation of numerous political parties and social organisations 
including Chinese ones. Meanwhile, as a result, the condemnation and pressure from 
international society, particularly from International Overseas Chinese Organisations, the 
government formed the Fact Finding Team for the May 1998 riots and investigated the riots. 
But the final report of the team was not conclusive about who main culprits of the riots were 
(Purdey 2009: 2). Various civic organisations criticised the Habibie government regarding 
the result of the report and carried out campaigns for seeking for the truth of the May 1998 
riots. 
After the resignation of President Habibie in September 1999, the succeeding two 
(President Wahid and Megawati) governments attempted to reconcile with the Chinese-
Indonesian community. Two leaders condemned the culprits of the May 1998 riots and 
promised to guarantee ethnic and religious rights of Chinese Indonesians. The leaders 
enacted several new regulations for Chinese Indonesians. For example, in 2000 President 
Wahid released Presidential Decree No. 6 for allowing display of Chinese culture and 
traditions in public sphere. Two years later, President Megawati made Chinese New Year as 
a national holiday from 2003. All these government policies and the changing attitude of 
political leaders have contributed to make a social milieu conducive for ethnic harmony 
because most indigenous Indonesians have welcomed those changes. It seems that the status 
and security of Chinese Indonesians in society was considerably improved. But Chinese 
Indonesians did not see this new environment conducive to secure their safety and rights 
because they still suffered from the trauma of ethnic riots of May 1998 (Freedman 2003: 
438). 
Indeed, the anti-Chinese riots in May 1998 resulted in a heightened awareness amongst 
Chinese Indonesians of their vulnerability in Indonesian society because government and 
military intervention were unable to halt the violence at a time of crisis. They also have been 
aware that they need help from their indigenous fellows to secure their security and rights 
(Purdey 2009). This awareness, in turn, mobilised them to participate in the establishment of 
political parties and civic organisations for securing their safety and rights. Chinese 
Indonesians pursue a range of paths (see Giblin 2003; Turner 2003; Wibowo 2001). Some 
Chinese Indonesians have chosen to maintain their relationships with the government and 
security forces as they did in the Suharto era, but many others have established political 
parties and social organisations. Four political parties were established in the post-Suharto 
era, but they failed to gain meaningful members of votes in elections.4 No Chinese-  
                                                          
4 In the general election in June 1999, Chinese political parties obtained only one seat in the national 




Table 1. List of Salient Civic Organizations Promoting Inter-ethnic Harmony 
Name of Organization Year Members Aims and Activities 
PSMTI (Association of 
Chinese Social Clan in 
Indonesia) 
 





SIMPATIK (Solidarity of 








































































































Promote Chinese culture and tradition; 
foster dialogue with indigenous 
counterparts 
 
Resolve ‘the Chinese Problem’ in 
Indonesia; promote Chinese culture: 
facilitate inter-ethnic harmony with 
humanitarian aid 
 
disseminate ethnic and religious 
pluralism; promote ethnic harmony  
 
 
Protect minority rights; fight for racial  
discrimination; organize civic 
networks 
 
Eradicate racial discrimination; 
conduct lobby for amending 
discriminatory laws; organize civic 
networks 
 
Provide helps to victims of state 
violence; prevent ethnic violence 
 
Protect women’s rights; seek for the 
truth of May 1998 anti-Chinese riots 
 
Promote inter-ethnic and inter-
religious harmony through dialogue 
meetings 
 
Prevent ethnic violence; facilitate 
solidarity between Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians 
 
Promote religious harmony; conduct 
joint prayers’ meeting 
Source: Author’s Summary. 
 
                                                          
parliament. Surprisingly, the majority of Chinese Indonesians voted for indigenous-dominated parties, 
particularly the PDI-P, instead their own political parties. See Suryadinata (2001) and Giblin (2003) 
for details about Chinese politics in Indonesia. 
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Indonesian political parties were allowed to participate in the 2004 general elections because 
of all of their parties failed to fulfill the government regulations for participation (Tempo, 
50/IV/Agustus 2004: 12). Many Chinese civic organisations were formed and they were 
active in abolishing discriminative laws and regulations in an era of democratisation. Thus, 
this section will highlight the activities of inter-ethnic civic organisations in cities of Jakarta 
and Solo cities where massive anti-Chinese riots took place during the May 1998 riots. 
Since the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998, numerous Chinese civic organisations 
have been established and are active in promoting their traditional culture and political 
interests. But they had different ideas on how to remove discrimination and injustice against 
them. As seen in the list of organisations above, around 15 civic organisations began to 
actively participate in the campaigns of ethnic harmony (Giblin 2003). Among them, 
Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI, Association of Chinese Social Clans 
in Indonesia) and Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (INTI, Indonesian Chinese Association) 
are well-known nationwide Chinese civic organisations in Indonesia. The members of these 
organisations in general are older compared to those of the anti-discrimination groups, which 
will be discussed later. PSMTI was the first Chinese-Indonesian civic organisation after the 
fall of Suharto. It was established by Tedy Jusuf (a retired police Brigadier General) and his 
colleagues in Jakarta in 28 September 1998. Its membership is open only to Chinese 
Indonesians; indigenous Indonesians are not allowed to join. The founding members of 
PSMTI were 88 Chinese Indonesians, who represented various Chinese-Indonesian clans in 
Indonesia (Giblin 2003: 357-8). In 2004, it has more than 70 branches across Indonesia 
(Hoon 2006: 173). Since its inception, PSMTI has attempted to promote Chinese culture and 
traditions through publications and educational programs. For example, in 2000, the general 
chairperson of PSMTI, Tedy Jusuf published a book entitled as “A Glimpse of Chinese 
Culture in Indonesia,” which introduced Chinese culture, marriage and burial traditions, art, 
festive celebrations, medicine, and costume. Another example is that since 2002, PSMTI has 
engaged in producing a TV program in the Jakarta area that promotes Chinese art and culture 
(Hoon 2006: 162-3). But the leaders of PSMTI often participate in dialogue meetings and 
inter-ethnic cooperation programs in order to facilitate ethnic harmony between Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians. 
Some members of PSMTI, who disagreed with Tedy Jusuf in terms of membership 
conditions, established a new civic organisation, INTI (Indonesian Chinese Association) in 
April 1999. Eddie Lombong, a Chinese businessman, led the establishment of INTI and 
opened its membership to indigenous Indonesians as well. Like PSMTI, INTI also aims to 
promote social and cultural issues including re-introducing Chinese language and culture to 
the young generations. But INTI has played a more active role in inter-ethnic cooperation. 
The members of INTI have attempted to promote cooperation among fellow Chinese 
Indonesians and between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in order to disseminate the 
ideas of ethnic harmony and democracy. INTI held a number of political education seminars 
for its members to foster ethnic pluralism and political participation (Jakarta Post, 25 March 
2000; 07 March 2006). On 4 May 2002, INTI undertook a collaborative project with the 
State Islamic University in Jakarta to facilitate a better understanding of the Chinese-
Indonesian community in Indonesia (Tan 2004: 38). INTI also has conducted a series of free 
medicine dispensing campaigns as a social service for the poor regardless of ethnicity or 
religion.   
As large Chinese-Indonesian mass organisations, PSMTI and INTI have exerted 
considerable influence in the Chinese-Indonesian community in Indonesia in raising social-




cultural issues. The leaders of these organisations encouraged their members to participate in 
Indonesian politics, but many of them did not agree with the establishment of Chinese-
Indonesian political parties (Kompas, 12 November 2008). They still fear an indigenous 
political backlash because the demise of the Suharto regime did not remove the indigenous 
perception that Chinese Indonesians dominated the national economy and that they used 
corrupt practices to expand their business interests throughout Indonesia (Purdey 2006: 182).  
Some other Chinese-Indonesian civic organisations were established after the May 1998 
riots by younger Chinese-Indonesian activists. Among them, Gerakan Perjuangan Anti 
Diskriminasi (GANDI, Indonesian Anti-discrimination Movement) and Solidaritas Nusa 
Bangsa (SNB, Homeland Solidarity) are well-known because these organisations apply an 
innovative approach to the promotion of Chinese-Indonesian security issues. As Suryadinata 
(2001) maintains, the formation of these organisations has been a new trend in Indonesia in 
the post-Suharto era. They attempt to form inter-ethnic civic organisations to abolish racial 
discrimination and facilitate Chinese-Indonesian security. In other words, both Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesian members work together to achieve common goals. They have fought 
with government officials regarding the SKBRI problem mentioned before; they have also 
provided legal aid to those who are discriminated against law. Taking advantage of the 
Reformasi, which has swept the country over the last 10 years, this new civic movement has 
had a significant impact on the lives of ethnic minorities in Indonesia including Chinese 
Indonesians because it builds ‘bridging social capital’ through inter-ethnic civic 
organisations and their networks. As Varshney (2001) argues, inter-ethnic civic engagement 
functions as a channel for communication and cooperation among different stakeholders so 
as to contain ethnic violence.  
SNB is an inter-ethnic civic organisation, which was founded on 5 June 1998 by lawyers 
and NGO activists, such as Arnold Purba, Esther Jusuf Purba, Surya Chandra, and Ekolin 
Hutabarat, in order to end racial and ethnic discrimination in Indonesia. Esther Jusuf Purba 
has led SNB since her Dayak husband, Arnold Purba, died (Sardani 2003: 335). According to 
Giblin (2003), SNB lobbies the government to amend discriminatory laws and holds various 
seminars and workshops to promote minority rights. SNB has played a significant role in 
promoting the issue of the eradication of anti-Chinese discrimination (Herlijanto 2004: 74). 
Since its inception, SNB has participated in the formation of civic networks together with 
PSMTI, GANDI, INTI, and other civic organisations to conduct their struggle together 
(Kompas, 26 January 1999). SNB succeeded in forming a civic network called the 
Organisation of May Riot Victims to find the culprits of the violence and demand financial 
compensation. SNB also participates in dialogue meetings among various civic organisations 
including SIMPATIK (Solidarity of Chinese Youth for Justice), Suara Ibu Peduli (Voice of 
Concerned Mothers), Kaliyana Mitra (Kaliyana Friends), and Jaringan Kerja Budaya 
(Cultural Projects Network) (Herlijanto 2004: 77). SNB has focused its activities on filing a 
lawsuit against the Indonesian government and demanding compensation for the victims. On 
20 February 2000, SNB submitted anti-discrimination laws to parliament to abolish 62 laws 
(and regulations) which discriminated against minorities, particularly Chinese Indonesians 
(Kompas, 21 February 2000). During the process of the lawsuit, SNB cooperated with other 
like-minded civic organisations such as INTI, PSMTI, GANDI, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 
(Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) and Forum Keluarga Korban Mei 1998 (Forum of 
Families of the Victims of May 1998) (Jakarta Post, 27 February 2003; Tan 2004: 40). 
These Chinese and indigenous civic organisations cooperated with each other to promote 
ethnic peace and secure minority rights. 
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Meanwhile, a group of young Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs, NGO activists, 
professionals, and religious leaders, who were concerned about the May 1998 violence, 
established Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi (GANDI, Indonesian Anti-discrimination 
Movement) in 6 November 1998. GANDI was led by Nico Krisnanto, a Chinese 
businessman from the Lippo Bank. It is interesting to note that the establishment of GANDI 
was officially declared at the home of Abdurrahman Wahid and that Megawati Sukarnoputri 
also attended and supported its establishment (Herlijanto 2004: 75-77; Purdey 2006: 175). 
GANDI had close links with Abdurrahman Wahid and his party (PKB), but it did not allow 
its members to join political parties (Giblin 2003: 358). Like SNB, GANDI aimed to end 
ethnic discrimination and promote minority rights. It also carried out public campaigns to 
disseminate ethnic pluralism and public awareness in the media (Jakarta Post, 27 August 
2003). Since its inception, it has focused on abolishing discriminative regulations and 
providing legal advocacy to ethnic minorities. In these actions, GANDI cooperated with 
other social organisations. In 2002, for example, it formed the Working Committee for the 
Study of Discriminatory Regulations together with the National Institution of Human Rights 
and the Communication Forum for National Unity (Effendi 2004). GANDI participated in 
the Coalition of Freedom of Information, together with SNB, the Independent Journalists 
Alliance, the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace, and the Indonesian Corruption 
Watch, to guarantee public access to necessary government information (Jakarta Post, 10 
March 2003). GANDI also formed the Civil Registration Consortium, together with the 
Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation, the UN Children’s Fund, and Plan International, to attempt to 
revise the Indonesian Civil Registration Act (Effendi 2004). The Consortium provided legal 
consultation to poor Chinese-Indonesian families to help them obtain birth certificates and 
persuaded the home affairs commission of the House of Representatives in Indonesia to pass 
a new bill (Jakarta Post, 10 July 2004). In September 2008, the general secretary of GANDI, 
Wahyu Effendi published a book that analysed the discriminative factors of the SKBRI 
(Indonesian Citizenship Certificate) for Chinese Indonesians (Kompas, 23 September 2008). 
Amid the plethora of reforms in Indonesian society, SNB and GANDI function as a platform 
of civil society organisations that pursue the abolition of discriminative laws and regulations 
against ethnic minorities, particularly Chinese Indonesians. 
In addition, there is a network of humanitarian civic organisations that deals with the 
victims of the May 1998 riots. Several civic organisations, including TRuK (Volunteer Team 
for Humanity), Mitra Perempuan (Women’s Friend) and Kontras (Commission for the 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence) are well known. TRuK is a core organisation amongst 
this group. Its members come from various ethnic, professional, and religious backgrounds 
and they build regional networks in Bandung, Kalimantan, Maluku and so forth (Nagata 
2003: 378). They have carried out action to protect women’s rights and consolidate the 
solidarity of the families of victims regardless of ethnicity or religion. Consequently, a new 
sense of solidarity has formed between the Chinese and indigenous Indonesian victims. 
Some Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs provided considerable financial support to these 
organisations, and other Chinese Indonesians joined them as volunteers after the May 1998 
violence (Purdey 2006: 169). The active participation of Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs is 
one of the new features of the civil society movement in the post-Suharto period.  
It is also important to note that some notable scholars and NGO activists established an 
inter-faith dialogue organisation, namely Institute Pluralisme Indonesia (IPI, Institute of 
Indonesian Pluralism). In October 2000, IPI was established by Thung Ju Ran, William 
Kwan, Abdullah Dahana, and their fellows (Fischer 2002: 9). It is an inter-ethnic 




organisation and aims to promote cooperation and understanding among different ethnicities 
and religions. To this end, IPI has cooperated with other civic organisations in disseminating 
pluralism and social harmony in the Jakarta area (Fischer 2002: 9). This type of inter-faith 
dialogue organisation has been popular in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. 
So did the Solonese establish similar social organisations? The Solo City case is 
interesting because the City has long been regarded as a place where Chinese Indonesians 
were well assimilated into the indigenous community (Thung 2001: 165). During 14-15 May 
1998, however, Chinese Indonesians in Solo City experienced severe anti-Chinese violence. 
The violence brought a greater fear to the Chinese-Indonesian community due to the loss of 
their guarantee of security (Purdey 2006: 137). As in many towns and cities across Indonesia, 
Chinese Indonesians in Solo relied for their security on government and military intervention. 
But the system was unable to halt the violence at a time of crisis. During the riots, 21 people 
lost their lives and hundreds of shops and houses, most of them owned by Chinese 
Indonesians, were looted and destroyed (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 18 May 1998).  
As a response to the violence in May 1998, the people of Solo City formed new civic 
organisations to fight ethnic and religious discrimination and to prevent recurrent ethnic 
violence. Local community leaders in Solo including artists, professionals, businessmen, and 
academics formed Paguyuban Wong Solo (PWS, Association of Solonese). The PWS has 
played an important role to “develop a more intensive communication among ethnic groups, 
especially between Javanese and Chinese ethnic groups” (Patrikno 2002: 17). The members 
of PWS provided shelter for Chinese-Indonesian families who suffered from the violence, 
and assisted victims in order to show their solidarity with them. Another civic organisation 
that plays a similar role is Paguyuban Pasopati (Association of Pasopati) in Solo City, a 
soccer mania club, which has attempted to bridge the socio-cultural gap between various 
ethnicities and religions (Patrikno 2002: 17). Meanwhile, in June 1998, student organisations 
in Solo also made attempts to bring Chinese and indigenous Indonesians together to institute 
inter-ethnic forums and discuss how to avoid a recurrence of the ethnic violence in the future 
(Purdey 2006: 139).  
The Solonese also formed two inter-religious civic organisations after the May 1998 riots. 
These organisations were Forum Kerukunan Umat Beriman Solo (FKUB, Interfaith 
Harmony Forum in Solo) and Forum Suara Hati Kebersamaan Bangsa (FSHKB, Forum of 
the Conscience of National Unity). The Forums were organised by community-based 
religious leaders such as kyai (Islamic clerics), priests, pastors, monks, and members of their 
respective religious communities. Through workshops and joint prayer meetings, they share 
experiences relating to inter-religious cooperation and harmony. The Forums have 
functioned as a platform for inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony in Solo City and the 
surrounding areas (Suwariyati 2002: 27). These organisations imitated a similar interfaith 
forum in Yogyakarta, namely Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman (FPUB, Interfaith 
Brotherhood Forum Yogyakarta), which greatly contributed to the prevention of ethnic 
violence in Yogyakarta during the economic and political crisis of 1998 (see Park 2008). 
FPUB was established in February 1997 in order to prevent the ethnic violence in the 
Yogyakarta area. In the post-Suharto era, the FPUB-like civic organisations were established 
in many cities in Indonesia for facilitating ethnic and religious peace, while restraining 
violent ethnic conflicts.  
The inter-ethnic and inter-religious cooperation between Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesians in Jakarta and Solo is an important element in the dissemination of ethnic and 
religious tolerance in Indonesian society. As Hoon (2006: 181) argues, these inter-ethnic and 
 JAE BONG PARK  86 
 
inter-religious organisations can be an effective discursive strategy for securing Chinese-
Indonesian minority rights. Although it is premature to judge their roles, for a group of 
Chinese Indonesians, civic organisations can be a more appropriate avenue to address their 
vulnerability in society. As Suryadinata (2001: 512) points out, the Chinese-Indonesian 
community tends to prefer to work with NGOs and other civic organisations to protect their 
own interests such as safety and citizenship rights rather than to deal with political parties 
due to a phobia of politics. In this view, the activities of these inter-ethnic civic organisations 
to promote ethnic harmony have been more reliable than the activities of ethnic-based 
political parties, which performed badly in the Indonesian elections. As Nagata (2003: 373) 
claims, the formation of inter-ethnic civic organisations between Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesians is beginning to gain greater acceptance within the broader Indonesian 
communities in which they operate.  
The emergence of new inter-ethnic civic organisations and their networks indicates that 
the Chinese-Indonesian community has gradually changed its perception and strategy for 
reducing its vulnerability in society. In fact, the Chinese-Indonesian community usually 
affiliated itself with the authorities or power holders for their economic interest and safety up 
until the New Order period. This patron-client arrangement was particularly resonant during 
the New Order period. During this period, as Putzel (1997) argues, Chinese-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs in general facilitated exclusive Chinese connections and networks. This meant 
that Chinese Indonesians have built ‘bonding social capital’ rather than ‘bridging social 
capital.’ Without inter-ethnic networks and cooperation, building ‘bridging social capital’ 
between themselves and indigenous Indonesians was difficult to achieve in society. The 






The Dutch colonial policies segregated Chinese Indonesians from the indigenous 
majority and helped Chinese traders dominate the Indonesian economy. These colonial 
legacies produced negative stereotypes for Chinese Indonesians in Indonesian society. 
During the New Order period, the cultural distinctiveness and extraordinary wealth of 
Chinese Indonesians had been regarded negatively and became a subject of criticism. While 
the government forced Chinese Indonesians to assimilate, policies of exclusion and 
separation prevailed. Consequently, the vulnerability of Chinese Indonesians was not 
reduced prior to the Asian economic crisis of 1998. When society was struck by political 
chaos and economic turmoil, Chinese Indonesians bore the brunt of the ensuing ethnic riots.  
The May 1998 violence brought about a heightened awareness amongst Chinese 
Indonesians of their vulnerability in Indonesian society. This awareness, in turn, mobilised 
them to participate in the establishment of political parties and civic organisations in order to 
secure their safety and rights. This is quite a different approach from the previous one where 
state and military interventions were regarded as the sole avenue to protect the Chinese-
Indonesian community during times of the heightened crisis. Among them, civic 
organisations have played a more critical role in securing their rights and facilitating ethnic 
cooperation than that of the political parties because of the inability of Chinese-Indonesian 
political parties to draw support from both Chinese and indigenous Indonesians.  
More importantly, after the May 1998 riots, inter-ethnic civic organisations, such as INTI, 




SNB, GANDI, PWS and TRuK, were established in conflicted cities to secure Chinese-
Indonesian rights and safety. This occurred because during the May 1998 riots, the 
government failed to protect Chinese Indonesians from ethnic violence due to the 
unprecedented ethnic antagonism of indigenous grassroots people (Massa) towards the 
Chinese-Indonesian community. In fact the main culprits of the anti-Chinese riots were poor 
indigenous Indonesians no matter what the underlying causes may have been (Siegel 2001). 
Consequently, as Purdey (2009) observes, many Chinese Indonesians are aware that their 
political and economic security is inextricably linked to the goodwill of their indigenous 
counterparts. 
To counter their security problem, from the outset the new Chinese-led civic 
organisations and their networks have endeavoured to disseminate pluralism and fight ethnic 
and religious discrimination together with their like-minded indigenous fellows and their 
organizations. A group of Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs continue to actively participate 
in and invest their money in these civic organisations. Although it is a long road to justice 
and equality, all these joint actions forge strong bonds of brotherhood regardless of ethnicity 
and religion. These joint actions are a new and innovative mode of protection for the 
Chinese-Indonesian community. If these inter-ethnic civic organisations and their networks 
continue to flourish, Chinese Indonesians can play a much larger role in civil society to 
promote their interests, and their safety will consequently be better protected than ever 
before. This is because the frequent contacts and dense networks among inter-ethnic civic 
organisations build stocks of bridging social capital in society. In order words, Chinese-
Indonesian security and human rights are being improved in the post-Suharto era as the 
activities of inter-ethnic civic organisations promote social trust and facilitate cooperation 
between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians.  
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